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 
Abstract— This paper surveys a broad range of other 
research works in order to discuss network security issues 
in the Internet of Things (IoT).  We begin with setting the 
scene generally with an outline of IoT, followed by a 
discussion of IoT layer models and topologies.  After this, 
IoT standardization efforts and protocols are analysed, 
before we discuss in depth vulnerabilities, attacks and 
mitigations with regard IoT. It is concluded that ample 
research and narrative exists for protocols and 
vulnerabilities but less on mitigations, particularly with 
regard Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for IoT, and 
resource constraints on devices are a considerable obstacle 
in strengthening security. 
 
Index Terms—counter-measures, internet of things, mesh 
networks, mitigations, network security, security, sensors, 
vulnerabilities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he term ‘Internet Of Things’ (IoT) was created by Kevin 
Ashton in 1999 and then formally introduced by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in the ITU 
Internet report in 2005.  The Cluster of European Research 
Projects (CERP) defines IoT as allowing people and things to 
be connected anytime, anyplace, with anything and anyone, 
ideally using any path/network and any service.  ‘Things’ are 
actual objects, for example wearables, thermostats like Google 
Nest, sensors in a car to detect speed or lighting sensors [1].   
IoT connects these objects together, letting them access the 
cloud, transfer data and provide information.  Things can be 
controlled remotely and also act as a gateway to the internet.   
By 2020 it is estimated that 4.5 billion new people and 37 
billion new things will have joined the internet [2].  The term 
Network of Things (NoT) will also be used in this paper, and 
we can say the IoT is made up of various NoT. 
IoT devices will have access to our sensitive personal data – 
as per the HP IoT Research study [3], suddenly everything from 
fridges to sprinklers are wired and interconnected, which 
creates new attack opportunities for hackers.  HP analysed 
devices from manufacturers of TVs, webcams, thermostats, 
door locks, home alarms, and more, finding some interesting 
results – 70% of devices used unencrypted network services and 
the majority failed to encrypt network services transmitting data 
via the internet and the local network.  
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Indeed, HP say that users are one network misconfiguration 
away from exposing this data to the world via wireless 
networks.  Leo, Battisti, Carli and Neri [4] state that the wide 
spread of sensors and actuators will increase the exposure of 
objects to cyber attacks.  This is true of NoT present at home, 
in the office, and also in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) - the 
Stuxnet malware worm, which caused massive disruption to 
Iranian nuclear centrifuges, is an example of NoT being 
compromised and ICS being damaged.  In fact, in the US the 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) has a specialist ICS team that reports on such 
incidents, showing its importance [4].     
II. AN OUTLINE OF IOT 
To begin with, the early work of Karlof & Wagner back in 
2003 [5] concerned secure routing in IoT, attacks and 
countermeasures.  This is something of a seminal paper.  They 
compare IoT with more traditional wireless networks, noting 
the resource constraints in IoT.  Sensor nodes have slow 
processors, limited computational power and little memory 
storage, typically comprising an 8-bit processor, RAM 
measured in KB rather than MB, a small radio and tiny battery.  
Shang, Yu, Droms and Zhang [6] give more detail on the power 
constraints, explaining IoT networks often use low-energy 
technologies such as IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth and low-power 
Wi-Fi.  These usually operate with a smaller Maximum 
Transmission Unit (MTU) and lower transmission rate than 
normal Ethernet links.  So packet sizes in IoT have to be 
smaller, and hence already we encounter a key technical 
challenge in keeping messages and packet overheads low.  
Garcia-Morchon et al [7] also point out IoT resource constraints 
cause reliance on lossy and low-bandwith channels, with 
resource expensive cryptography limited too.      
Kim, Wasicek, Mehne and Lee [8] present a realistic view 
that NoT will be deployed in open, physically insecure or 
hostile environments open to attack.  [5] significantly describes 
some attacks for the first time, like the sinkhole attack, the 
HELLO flood, the wormhole attack and the Sybil attack.  We 
shall discuss these vulnerabilities and more, plus 
countermeasures and mitigations, later in this paper.   
[5] introduces the idea of NoT having points of centralised 
control called base stations, which are gateways to another 
network, data storage / processing centres or an access point for 
a human interface.  Traditional networks are point-to-point, or 
end to-end, whereas NoT traffic can be many-to-one (sending 
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data from nodes to a base), one-to-many (base to nodes 
communication, like a multicast or a message flood) and local 
(for example neighboring nodes talking).  Roman and Lopez [9] 
raise the idea, on the other hand, of decentralizing, where all 
nodes participate in decision making and internal protocol, 
known as a flat configuration, or dividing NoT into clusters of 
nodes, each with a cluster head to make decisions, known as a 
hierarchical configuration.  
Nalbandian [1] gives a suitable outline of IoT, though lacks 
detail one expects with regard specific security challenges, for 
example mentioning Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
usage without mentioning its vulnerabilities, though these are 
presented by Xingmei, Jing and He [10], which we will review.  
However, other papers do address specific security challenges.  
[1] points out the simple lack of human control means the 
devices need managed and protected, a moot point really.  [1] 
could have been improved with more information on topologies 
and implementation details, which we will discuss by gathering 
points from [9], Zegzhda and Stepanova [11] and [7]. 
III. IOT LAYER MODELS 
To help understand IoT compared to traditional networks, 
two different layer models are proposed by previous research, 
in a similar fashion to the well-known OSI model for 
networking. Firstly, Mahoud, Yousuf, Aloul and Zualkerman 
[12] present a simple model of three layers - perception, 
network and application.  This is perhaps a little basic given the 
complexity of IoT, and the paper does not compare it with the 
second model that CISCO [2] have proposed. 
 
The three-layer model consists of:  
 
1) Perception layer – consider this a sensor layer, acquiring data 
from an environment via sensors and actuators.  This layer 
detects, collects and processes info before transmitting it to the 
network layer.   
2) Network layer – performs IoT node collaborations in local 
and short range networks.  Handles data routing and 
transmission to different IoT hubs and devices over the internet.  
Clouds, gateways, switches and routers use wireless protocols 
here.   
3) Application layer – guarantees authenticity / integrity / 
confidentiality of data.   
 
CISCO contend that IoT-ready networks need a different 
communication and processing model.  As it stands today, there 
is not a standard way of understanding or describing these 
models.  CISCO offer an IoT reference model of seven layers 
(see figure A).  Their model aims to help secure each device or 
system, provide security for all processes at each level, plus 
secure movement and communications between each level, 
whether north bound or south bound: 
 
Layer 7 – Collaboration and Processes - involving people and 
business processes, e.g. identity management software. 
Layer 6 – Application – involves reporting, analytics and 
control e.g. authentication/authorization software. 
Layer 5 – Data Abstraction – involves aggregation and access, 
and secure storage e.g. hardware and software solutions. 
Layer 4 – Data Accumulation – also involves storage e.g. 
tamper resistant software. 
Layer 3 – Edge (Fog) Computing - data element analysis and 
transformation where the network meets the cloud e.g. secure 
communications via protocols and encryption. 
Layer 2 – Connectivity – involves communication and 
processing units e.g. secure network access via hardware and 
protocols. 
Layer 1 – Physical Devices and Controllers – these are the 
things in IoT. 
 
 
Fig. A.  The CISCO seven-layer model [2]. 
 
Mohsen and Jha [13] also use the CISCO model to discuss 
IoT and mostly consider the edge side layers 2 and 3 above.  We 
shall study the attacks contained in [13] later in this paper. 
IV. IOT TOPOLOGIES 
[11] proposes three useful topologies:  point to point, star and 
mesh.  The latter is decentralized, and preferable.  Mesh has a 
gateway node, simple sensor nodes, and nodes that can work as 
both sensors and routers.  [11] recommends decentralised mesh 
for mitigation, agreeing with [9] in saying centralization has a 
weakness in providing a single point of failure if using the front-
end proxy solution.  [7] also agrees, stating that using a central 
security manager represents a single point of failure and fixes 
network roles statically, with decentralized and distributed 
architecture being more dynamic.  [6] contends that the 
fundamental challenge of routing in IoT mesh networks comes 
from the requirement of maintaining routing information for 
each host in a multilink environment.  This is not an issue in 
traditional IP networks where routers or self-learning bridges 
can be deployed to provide infrastructural support for routing 
and forwarding.  However, in constrained IoT environments, 
the per-host routes are either maintained by every node in the 
mesh using routing protocols, which consumes lots of memory, 
or carried with the IP packet as source routes during forwarding 
which conflicts with the small MTU restriction. 
V. IOT STANDARDISATION & PROTOCOLS 
Convergence toward an IP-based communication stack is 
necessary as IoT has very diverse wireless communications 
with gateway devices needed for protocol translation.  The 
surveyed papers discuss numerous protocols with 6LoWPAN, 
IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks 
(RPL), Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), 
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Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), IPSec and Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) mentioned most. 
Firstly, consider the large number of IP addresses required in 
the IoT. IPv4 cannot support this, so IPv6 will be used.  
However, with the device limitations additional protocols are 
needed.  The Internet Engineering TaskForce (IETF) have 
developed 6LoWPAN and RPL.  6LoWPAN uses compression 
to allow IPv6 packets to be sent over wireless networks made 
up of resource constrained devices.  CoAP is an application 
layer protocol to let devices communicate, using User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP).  It can be translated to HTTP for use 
over the web.  According to [7], DTLS is the basic building 
block for protecting CoAP.  TinyDTLS is the first open-source 
implementation of the protocol for small devices but it has not 
really been road-tested.  DTLS was designed for computer 
networks rather than IoT, and [6] points out DTLS imposes high 
overheads on IoT devices.  The loss of a message in flight 
requires retransmitting all messages – far from ideal.  
Elbouanani, Kiram and Achbarou [14] explain further how 
6LoWPAN defines header compression to allow IPv6 packets 
to be sent between resource constrained devices and make the 
point that a common set of standards are needed for IoT.  They 
also give more detail on the three RPL modes of varying levels 
of security (unsecured, preinstalled and authenticated) which 
other papers do not seem to do.   
Keoh, Kumar and Tschofenig [15] note the optimisation of 
DTLS for CoAP, and that IETF are working on a standard way 
of granting permissions and authorizing IoT to accept each 
other’s resources.  They suggest two other protocols for security 
as well as DTLS – 1) IPSec, for channel security via AH 
(Authentication Headers) and data security via ESP 
(Encapsulating Security Payloads) traffic, and 2) IKEv2, which 
is used to establish IPSec.  Interestingly [9] says IPSec is not 
supported for network layer security when using the 6LowPAN 
spec but is sparse on reasons why. 
Fragmentation due to a smaller MTU is problematic and open 
to attack as mentioned in other papers such as [7].   The trend 
of identifying IPSec and DTLS continues in [7].  [6] and [15] 
develop the fragmentation and small MTU issues well, with the 
latter explaining at most 102 bytes are available for an IP packet 
after taking into consideration MAC frame header size and 
security.  Of this 102, another 48 bytes are needed for IPv6 and 
UDP headers, leaving just 64 bytes for application data and its 
security protection.  Hence fragmentation is needed, and as 
stated this is vulnerable. 
[15] also references 6LoWPAN, RPL and CoAP for resource 
constrained devices and discusses standardisation in IoT, 
looking specifically at protocols to be used in conjunction with 
CoAP.  According to [15], DTLS has been chosen as the 
channel security under CoAP for IoT.  [15] says standardised 
security protocol is indispensable for success of IoT.  DTLS 
was not designed for constrained environments though - it still 
has its weaknesses, as discussed in [7], with packet 
fragmentation and having to retransmit all messages in flight if 
one listed as drawbacks.  [15] argues that a critical mass of 
devices may be needed to achieve an interoperable/standardised 
IoT, and designing a totally new protocol may seem like 
reinventing the wheel.  However, as per the future device 
figures outlined initially in this survey paper, a critical mass of 
devices is inevitable. 
RFID is common in IoT.  RFID tags containing antennae are 
attached to objects so they can be tracked and identified via 
wireless/radio technology.  However, it is vulnerable, as we will 
see, and work needs to be done for connecting RFID devices 
over the actual internet. 
[14] introduces MQTT (formerly MQ Telemetry Transport) 
as another protocol not seen in other papers, which was created 
by OASIS.  MQTT is simple and lightweight, again suiting 
resource constrained devices.  Andrea, Chrysostomou and 
Hadjichristofi [16] also contend that MQTT, along with CoAP, 
is most commonly used in IoT. 
VI. IOT VULNERABILITIES & ATTACKS 
In cyber security, the Confidentiality – Integrity – 
Availability (CIA) triad is well known.  None of the surveyed 
papers however relate CIA back to IoT apart from [13].  The 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) also have a 
useful list of IoT Attack Surface Areas which they state should 
be understood by manufacturers, developers, researchers and 
companies looking to deploy IoT in their organisations [17].  As 
mentioned, [5] outlined some IoT attacks for the first time and 
these are regularly referenced in the literature (for example by 
Wood, Fang and Stankovic [18], and [16]) – these are the 
sinkhole attack, the Sybil attack, the wormhole attack, the 
HELLO flood and acknowledgement spoofing: 
 
1) Sinkhole attack – all traffic is lured from an area through a 
compromised node, where selective forwarding can follow with 
the attacker deciding what data to allow through.  
2) Sybil attack – a single node presents multiple identities to 
others in the network, so an attacker can be in more than one 
place at once. 
3)  Wormhole attack – an attacker tunnels messages received in 
one part of the network over a low latency link and replays them 
in a different part.   
4)  HELLO flood – here the attacker causes every node to mark 
it as their parent.  Most nodes will be out of range and this 
causes a lot of packets to be lost.  Routing loops can be set up 
too via spoofing routing updates, with two nodes being attacked 
and redirecting packets to each other. 
5)  Acknowledgement spoofing - used for a selective forwarding 
attack, where an attacker strengthens/weakens networks links 
so packets are lost from a node. 
 
[13] discusses the attacks at layer 2 and layer 1 of the CISCO 
seven-layer model, stating conventional network attacks are 
also applicable to IoT: 
 
Layer 2: Connectivity - attacks 
 
a) Eavesdropping / sniffing – gains usernames, passwords, node 
identifiers and other useful data. 
b) DoS attacks – jam the transmission of radio signals or, via a 
malicious node, refuse to route messages, or redirects them 
where they shouldn’t go.   
c) Injecting fraudulent packets – done via insertion (where 
malicious packets that seem legit are generated and sent), 
manipulation (when packets are captured then modified) and 
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replication (where the attacker captures packets between two 
things to replay them). 
d) Routing attacks – an attacker can spoof, redirect, misdirect 
or drop packets, for example the wormhole, HELLO flood and 
Sybil attacks.   
 
Layer 1: Physical devices & controllers - attacks 
 
a) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks – such as battery draining by 
an attacker sending lots of packets, outage attacks, or when an 
edge device stops performing its normal operation, like the 
Stuxnet attack mentioned in this paper’s introduction. 
b) Node replication attacks – the attacker adds a new node to 
an existing set by replicating another node’s ID number.  This 
can lead to reduction in network performance and the attacker 
can easily corrupt or misdirect packets that arrive at the 
replicated node.  
c) Camouflage - the attacker inserts a counterfeit edge node or 
attacks an authorized node to hide at the edge level.  Then it can 
obtain and manipulate packets, or be passive and just analyse 
traffic.   
 
Gubbi, Buyya, Marusic and Palaniswami [19] make a valid 
point that RFID is a weak protocol that allows person tracking 
and object tracking.  These devices are too small to use complex 
security algorithms.  They suggest cryptography can help, air 
the idea of digital forgetting to protect privacy, and state new 
protocols are a large area of research.  However, they do not 
delve into the specifics of attacks.  The threats to RFID are 
significant, well summarised by [10]: 
 
1. Replication attack – copy or forge identical RFID labels. 
2. Channel Blocking attacks – channel is occupied for a long 
time and legit communications can’t be transferred. 
3. Forgery attack - legit RFID label is obtained by using special 
hardware facilities of counterfeit. 
4. Impersonation attack – attacker fakes a legit reader to steal 
or change RFID tag info. 
5. Tampering attack – attacker will modify the info and pass it 
on to receiver. 
 
[13] adds to the RFID threats detailing: 
 
1. Tracking – in close proximity a reader can read a tag.  
Dangerous when combined with personal info. 
2. Inventorying – info can be deduced from device tags 
3. DoS – RF channels are jammed so the tags cannot be read by 
tag readers and the intended services become unavailable, e.g. 
locking down a whole building. 
4. Eavesdropping – messages are intercepted/read/saved for 
future. 
 
Eavesdropping, routing attacks and DoS attacks are common 
themes in [7] too, with conventional Man-In-The-Middle 
(MITM) attacks also possible in IoT if keying material is 
exchanged in the clear, or if device authentication is non-trivial 
and needs human interaction.  [12] discusses attacks in terms of 
its three-layer model similar to [13], specifically for a network 
layer – like [7], it points out it is susceptible to DoS attacks, 
MITM and eavesdropping though does lack the depth of info 
from other papers. 
[8] notes that authentication based on digital certificates 
cannot scale to the size needed.  This paper also recommends 
using DTLS and CoAP, though warns that DTLS is for point-
to-point rather than publish-subscribe (i.e. one-to-many).  [6] 
gives a warning for DTLS that other papers do not give, 
contending DTLS applies in IP-based apps but as a secure 
channel solution it does not fit into IoT for several reasons.  
Firstly, there is the overhead of establishing a channel, and 
secondly both ends of the channel having to maintain the state 
of the channel until it closes.  This hinders memory usage when 
a device needs to communicate with many peers simultaneously 
in a densely-meshed network.  
VII. MITIGATIONS / COUNTER MEASURES 
A layered approach is always best - [9] says that IoT must 
be secured from hardware of nodes right through to 
applications, and the surveyed papers make recommendations 
for mitigation in different areas.  Tankard [20] recommends a 
holistic view by designing security in from the operating 
system, using the devices hardware capabilities and extending 
up the device stack.  This paper lacks detail, but rightly points 
out that adding security to legacy devices, rather than solely 
focusing on devices to come, is important.  Other papers have 
failed to recognise legacy vulnerabilities to the same extent.  
[16] outlines that securing premises is perhaps the most 
important – this is a short-sighted point in truth.  [15] and [7] 
say that the computational capabilities of embedded systems 
in IoT will improve and so eventually they will be able to run 
the full IP protocol stack, meaning some mitigations may be 
temporary.  Still, we need to look at the present situation.  
Mitigations include: 
A. Choice of Protocol: 
Specifically proposed in [7] as a countermeasure to DoS are 
DTLS and IPSec/IKEv2.  They implement return route checks 
based on cookies to delay state establishment until the 
initiating host address is verified.  [7] also suggests puzzle-
based approaches that forces the initiator to solve 
cryptographic puzzles of varying difficulty.  This should be 
used with care, as under attack conditions that reduce device 
performance, clients may not be able to solve these puzzles 
and suffer exclusion.  [7] states DTLS together with 
IPSec/IKEv2 provide end-to-end security services including 
peer entity authentication, end-to-end encryption and integrity 
protection.   
[18] proposes Secure Implicit Geographic Forwarding 
(SIGF), a configurable secure routing protocol for NoT.  It 
does not use routing tables, preventing state corruption, 
wormholes and HELLO floods.  Still, this protocol is open to 
DoS and Sybil attacks. 
To reduce packet loss, [6] suggests legacy protocols should 
be redesigned to minimise use of IP multicast before they can 
be applied to IoT.  They say is it better for nodes to pull 
packets on-demand from a store where packets are buffered.  
In addition, [13] offers depattern-ing as a mitigation, where 
fake packets are inserted to fool the attacker.  This is a novel 
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idea and was not present in other papers that suggested 
mitigations. 
[8] concludes that secure routing is vital to acceptance and 
use of IoT, though current routing protocols are insecure with 
a new standard being needed, and we should be aware of 
attacks coming from more powerful devices outside the 
network i.e. powerful laptops and desktops which can easily 
break cryptography.  
B. Choice of Topology: 
[11] points out decentralised topology is good for mitigation 
and uses Wireless HART as an example.  It does say the IoT 
evolution plateau will be circa 2025, but given the speed of 
progress, which could be considered exponential, this plateau 
could be sooner. 
C. Consider Application Data Security: 
The IETF has suggested object-based security which 
secures the application data directly rather than securing the 
channel through which the data is transmitted [8].  Each object 
should have digital signatures so anyone receiving it can 
verify its validity.   
D. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): 
Raza, Wallgren and Voigt [21] proposed an IoT specific 
IDS called SVELTE, with the driving force being that 
message security is of course an issue but nevertheless 
networks are vulnerable to a number of attacks to disrupt 
services.   [13] references SVELTE as one of the first IDS for 
IoT, Gendreau and Moorman [22] seems to go so far as saying 
that the prevention of unauthorised access to IoT will depend 
on intrusion detection capability of embedded devices.  This is 
true though future protocol standards and legal regulations are 
still needed in parallel.   
E. RFID Specific Mitigations: 
For attacks on RFID tags, [13] suggests personal firewalls to 
examine all readers’ requests to read tags, along with the use of 
cryptography, though full encryption is difficult with IoT 
resource constraints.   Hash-based schemes are more widely 
used, where a RFID reader gets a hashed key from a locked 
RFID tag which it sends to a database.  The database returns a 
key to the reader which it uses to unlock the tag. 
F. Reducing Risk Through Legislation: 
Of the resources surveyed, Verizon [23] are one of the few 
to mention changing the law as a form of mitigation, 
discussing data protection laws and the trade-off between 
security and convenience.  Without legislation, manufacturers 
can’t be compelled to include security [20], and IoT will have 
to comply with European regulatory frameworks.  For 
example, it is expected 80% of households will have energy 
meters by 2020 [24]. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
One could go so far as to say the vulnerabilities outweigh 
counter measures.  Mitigations based on IP are not enough due 
to device constraints and, as it the present point in time, a lack 
of standards.   A lot has been written (and repeated) with 
regard to protocols and channel based security solutions.   
Therefore, plenty of research opportunities exist elsewhere, 
like in energy saving cryptography techniques that are 
lightweight enough for IoT, the use of IDS in IoT and how to 
do more with the constrained resources of devices – recall also 
that processing power doubles every two years according to 
Moore’s Law, so some mitigations that exist now could just be 
a stopgap until the device resources catch up.  In addition, 
none of the surveyed papers covered the issue of mobility in 
IoT.  The rise in popularity of wearables poses a complex 
issue of handling devices regularly leaving one NoT and 
joining another.   
IoT is set to impact society significantly, and with attackers 
already exploiting the early adoption of IoT in a myriad of 
ways, a new conclusion can be drawn that IoT will become the 
most vulnerable area of cyber security, with the race already 
underway to protect both legacy and future devices through 
technology and robust legislation. 
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